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Of the components of GDP, residential investment offers by far the best early warning sign of an oncoming
recession. Since World War II we have had eight recessions preceded by substantial problems in housing
and consumer durables.  Housing did not give an early warning of the Department of Defense Downturn
after the Korean Armistice in 1953 or the Internet Comeuppance in 2001, nor should it have. By virtue
of its prominence in our recessions, it makes sense for housing to play a prominent role in the conduct
of monetary policy.  A modified Taylor Rule would depend on a long-term measure of inflation having
little to do with the phase in the cycle, and, in place of Taylor's output gap, housing starts and the change
in housing starts, which together form the best forward-looking indicator of the cycle of which I am
aware. This would create pre-emptive anti-inflation policy in the middle of the expansions when housing
is not so sensitive to interest rates, making it less likely that anti-inflation policies would be needed
near the ends of expansions when housing is very interest rate sensitive, thus making our recessions
less frequent and/or less severe.
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My goal is to provide unforgettable images that leave a lasting impression regarding the 
importance of housing to what we call the business cycle.   Before we get to the displays, 
I need to issue a couple of caveats and comments. 
Housing and Academic Macroeconomics 
The bad news is that I am not a macro-economist.  Wicksell and Hayek and Keynes and 
Friedman and Tobin and Lucas and Prescott speak foreign languages with which I have 
familiarity but not mastery. 
 
The good news is that I am not a macro-economist.   That frees me from the heavy 
conceptual burdens that most macro economists seem to carry.  It allows me to conclude 
that Keynesian thinking, monetarism, rational expectations and real business cycles all 
suffer from the same problem – too much theory and not enough data.  In particular, none 
of these comes to grips with the role of housing in modern US recessions.  
 
Indeed, if you look up “real estate” in the index to Mankiw’s(2007) best selling 
Principles of Macroeconomics, you will find real exchange rates, real GDP, real interest 
rates, real variables, and even reality, but no real estate. Under “housing” you will find a 
reference to the CPI and to rent control, but no reference to the business cycle.  I have not 
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But it’s not just a problem with our theory.  The NBER macroeconomics data miners 
have largely missed housing too.  The index to Victor Zarnowitz’ (1992) Business Cycle, 
Theory, History, Indicators, and Forecasting has no reference to real estate or to housing. 
(Actually, there are no “h”s in the index at all.)   Likewise, the index to James H. Stock 
and Mark W. Watson’s edited volume, Business Cycles, Indicators and Forecasting, has 
no references to residential investment or to housing.  Housing is treated with the same 
level of interest that building permits has in the Index of Leading Indicators: one of many 
things that might predict a recession, about as interesting as x7 in the list x1, x2, x3, …., 
x10. 
 
There is a substantial, mostly older literature on the modeling of residential investment. 
(e.g. Alberts(1962), Fair(1972), Ketchum(1954), de Leeuw and Gramlich(1969)) This 
literature takes the overall business cycle as given and explores the effects of income and 
interest rates on residential investment.  By including interest rates as explanatory 
variables, this literature does explicitly explore the link from monetary policy to housing, 
but when Maisel(1967), for example, reports that residential investment is an important 
channel through which monetary policy affects the economy, that finding is treated like 
the discovery that alcohol has it effects by depressing the central nervous system, which 
is a mildly interesting fact that doesn’t at all affect how much we drink.  Another round 
of grog, please. 
 
Something’s wrong here.   Housing is the most important sector in our economic 
recessions and any attempt to control the business cycle needs to focus especially on 
                                                 
1 To get some insight into the current state of macroeconomics, I recommend a few pages from Frederick 
Brown’s biography Flaubert that describe the state of medicine in 18
th Century France, contrasting the 
physicians (theorists) with the surgeons (empiricists). 
 
Although France had produced the great surgeon Ambroise Paré in Rabelais’s time, it took most 
of the eighteenth century and a battalion of philosophes challenging well-entrenched pieties to 
clear the ground for clinical medicine.   Set against it were not only the church but a high culture 
whose apologists felt impelled to frame the physical or sensual world in rationalist hypotheses.  
Behind its ogives on the rue de la Bûcherie, the Medical Faculty, where lectures were given in 
Latin and readily understood by youths, mostly wellborn, who had earned a master of arts degree, 
restricted its teaching to humane letters, to natural philosophy, and to medical theory derived from 
classical texts.  Never dissecting a dead person or laying hands on a sick one, future physicians 
became thoroughly conversant with Hippocrates and Galen, but remained largely ignorant of 
humanity in the flesh.  Proud to be called antiquarum tenax, this establishment, which scoffed, for 
example, at William Harvey’s discovery that blood circulates, regarded surgery as a subordinate 
discipline, a manual or “mechanical” trade, fit for the dexterous and the inarticulate.  ….  
Threatened as they increasingly were, they sought shelter from modern times in the distinction 
conferred upon humanists by their knowledge of the language that gave one access to medical 
scripture.  However skillful the artisan, without Latin he spoke without intellectual authority.  
(p.12) 
… 
When medicine at last began to tilt decisively away from ancestor worship, visual analysis gained 
ground. Anatomical atlases gradually supplanted classical texts.  (p.14)   3
residential investment.  But housing presents a special control problem because monetary 
policy affects mostly the timing of the building but not the total building.  After a surge 
of building there has to be a time-out, like we are experiencing today, before building can 
get back to normal, and before this channel through which monetary policy affects the 
real economy is operative again.  The Fed can stimulate now, or later, but not both.    
 
The differences in the dynamics of inflation and housing create a problem for the conduct 
of monetary policy that is aimed at both inflation and housing-related employment.  
Inflation is very persistent, and needs to be fought every day.  For housing it’s the cycle 
that is persistent.  Once the cycle starts, it keeps on going.  Like a pebble thrown into a 
smooth pond of water.  The best time to fight the housing cycle with tight monetary 
policy is when the wave is starting to rise, not when it is cresting.   The worst time to 
stimulate the economy with loose monetary policy is when the wave is starting to rise.   
That is going to make the crest all the higher, and the crash all the more catastrophic.  
You know of which I speak, I suppose?    
 
To put the point as clearly as possible, what I am advocating is a modified Taylor Rule 
that depends on a long-term measure of inflation having little to do with the phase in the 
cycle, and, in place of Taylor’s output gap, housing starts and the change in housing 
starts, which together form the best forward-looking indicator of the cycle of which I am 
aware.    This would create pre-emptive anti-inflation policy in the middle of the 
expansions when housing is not so sensitive to interest rates,  making it less likely that 
anti-inflation policies would be needed near the ends of expansions when housing is very 
interest rate sensitive, thus making our recessions less frequent and/or less severe.  
 
WARNING: Causal conclusions from temporal orderings 
Though I am not a macroeconomist, my econometric credentials do give me some special 
knowledge of the problems of drawing causal inferences from nonexperimental data.   
 
Medieval empirics came to the conclusion that blood-letting helped because the health of 
the patients often improved after the blood was let, but we know now that temporal 
orderings do not reveal causality, even though Clive Granger(1969) has christened the 
post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy with the name “Granger Causality.”   
 
For valid causal conclusions, we need an experiment; we need a control group and a 
treated group.  When all we have are non-experimental data, correlation is in the data but 
causation is in the mind of the observer.    
 
With only temporal orderings and no experimental evidence, we do what empirics do: we 
rely on stories. To each temporal ordering we attach a predictive narrative or a causal 
narrative or both.  We draw firm causal conclusions from the temporal orderings when 
the causal narrative is compelling and when there is no equally compelling predictive 
narrative.  This is literature and wisdom, not science. 
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Take interest rates, for example.  A pretty good predictive story is that the arrival of the 
storm we call recessions is met by a reduction of interest rates.   When the storm 
inevitably dissipates, we cannot conclude that the interest rates caused the recovery 
merely because of the temporal ordering: first the lowering of interest rates and then the 
recovery.  We sometimes suggest that the umbrellas we carry stop the storms too, but I 
think we are only joking, aren’t we? 
 
We economists have a deep dislike of predictive narratives.  Economics, unlike the other 
social sciences, is a self-consciously interventionist discipline.  We think we are 
designing the best way for our governments to influence the outcomes.   For that purpose, 
of course, we must have causal beliefs.   Thus, so as not to confuse the initiates, our 
introductory economics textbooks rarely mention predictive stories, but instead we 
indoctrinate our students with the causal narrative of the IS-LM model or the equivalent.   
For some, the force of the causal story of the IS-LM model has been offset completely by 
the power of the predictive narrative of the Lucas Critique.  For most economists, the 
knowledge assumptions of the Lucas Critique make that story more than a little far-
fetched.   Thus IS-LM thinking is very much alive. 
 
So there you have it:  It’s faith-based decision making, which is much influenced by the 
rhetorical skills of the advocates.   I would be conveying accurately the scientific validity 
of the opinions expressed here if, in the printed version, about 50% of the pixels were 
removed so you could hardly read what I have written, and, in the spoken version, if I 
slurred my speech to the point that you could hardly understand what I have said.  
Summary 
In the next section, I remind you that for 35 years the US economy has been growing at a 
surprisingly constant rate of 3%.   Within the range of policies tested over the last 35 
years, none has had a demonstrable effect on long-term growth.  From that I conclude 
that all we need to worry about is the cycle, provided we don’t choose some risky new 
maneuvers for this Titanic we call the economy. 
 
Section 3 reports the timing facts about the ten US recessions since World War II:  We 
have experienced eight recessions preceded by substantial problems in housing and 
consumer durables. We have experienced one Department of Defense downturn after the 
Korean Armistice in 1953 and one Internet Comeuppance in 2000/2001, driven by a 
collapse in business investment in equipment and software.  Except for those two special 
events, it’s been a consumer cycle not a business cycle.  
 
A reason why housing is so important in recessions is the subject of Section 4.  Our 
market system relies on price flexibility to assure that labor and capital are productively 
employed, but house prices are very inflexible downward, and when demand softens as it 
has in 2005 and 2006, we get very little price adjustment but a huge volume drop.  For 
GDP and for employment, it’s the volume that matters.   
 
In Section 5 I discuss the financial cycle that supports the housing cycle, and look for 
evidence of a cycle in idiosyncratic house price risk and a cycle in the relative prices of   5
expensive versus cheap homes, both of which may be symptoms of a mortgage market 
that reaches ever-deeper into the barrel of current-renters as the expansion continues, 
picking from that barrel homebuyers with lower incomes and weaker credit scores, who 
are buying mostly the entry-level of homes.  If these cycles do exist, they should attract 
the attention of our monetary authorities because they cause damage to Americans who 
can least afford it.   The idiosyncratic risk in the Los Angeles market is surprisingly high 
(30% of value) but not apparently cyclical.  But during the “bubble” that is now leaking, 
it was the smaller homes in the lower-priced zip-codes that experienced the greatest rates 
of appreciation.  That run-up in relative prices of the less-expensive homes could be 
permanent if innovations in finance have permanently increased the fraction of 
homeowners, raising the relative demand for cheaper homes.  But I doubt it.  In 2007, all 
the anecdotes suggest foreclosures are differentially favoring the lower-income 
neighborhoods, just as do the pink slips of labor market dismissals.  We should care 
about this. 
 
By virtue of its prominence in our recessions, it makes sense for housing to play a 
prominent role in the conduct of monetary policy.  Section 6 deals with the policy 
conflicts between inflation targets and hypothetical housing targets.   If housing were the 
target, our Fed has been missing the mark widely, most especially in the aftermath of the 
2001 recession when the Fed Funds rate was held so low for so long.  Best to remember 
that the teaser rates for mortgages came from Washington, DC, not from Wall Street, and 
not from your local mortgage originator.   
 
Of course, the Fed was pursuing an anti-deflation program in 2002-2004.  But the 
message from the housing market is that it is not general deflation or deflation of rental 
rates that matters; it is the deflation of the asset prices of durables, particularly homes.   
Declining prices for assets like homes make the (own) real interest rate great even if the 
nominal interest rate is zero.  For a highly leveraged investment like housing, it doesn’t 
take much in the way of an asset price decline to kill off building, even if the rental 
market is strong, and to completely eliminate any potential for a stimulative rate cut.   
Ironically, the Fed’s great concern about deflation has created the very deflation problem 
they were trying to avoid.   
 
The inevitable effect of the low rates has been an acceleration of the home building clock, 
transferring building backward in time from 2006-2008 to 2003-2005.  Our Fed thus 
implicitly made the decision: more in 2003-2005 at the cost of less in 2006-2008.  That 
strikes me as a very risky choice.  The historical record strongly suggests that in 2004 and 
2005 we poured the foundation for a recession in 2007 or 2008 led by the collapse in 
housing we are currently experiencing.  Only twice have we had this kind of housing 
collapse without a recession, in 1951 and in 1967, and both times the Department of 
Defense came to the rescue, because of the Korean War and the Vietnam War.  We don’t 
want that kind of rescue this time, do we?  
 
But don’t worry.  This time we don’t need the DOD to save us.  This time troubles in 
housing will stay in housing.  It’s because manufacturing has done an “L” of a job.   An 
official recession cannot occur without job loss, but as can be seen in Figure 1, outside of   6
manufacturing and construction there is little or no job loss.  The sectors with volatile 
employment are manufacturing and construction, illustrated in Figure 2.   Look at 
manufacturing.  It’s V, V, V in every recession - a sharp drop in jobs and a sharp 
recovery.  The 1990 recession was different.  That was a U.  But in the 2001 recession we 
got an L!  Though this is largely uncharted territory, it doesn’t look like manufacturing is 
positioned to shed enough jobs to generate a recession.    And without the job loss, expect 
the housing adjustment to be shallower but more long-lasting. 
 
Finally, in the concluding section, in an already overly long paper, I offer some brief 
comments on the links between consumer durables and homes, and briefly survey the 
literature on housing and the business cycles in other countries.   
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The 3-3 Rule of US Real GDP 
 
As far as US Real GDP is concerned, don’t worry about long-run growth. 
 
Make a list of events over the last 40 years that you imagine might have substantially 
affected the level of US GDP.   Does your list include the 1970s oil price shocks, the 
Reagan tax cuts, the inflation of the 1970s, the evolution of real rates of interest, the 
peace dividend, the economic liberalizations in the developing world, the personal 
computer, the Internet Rush, and the Bush W. tax cuts?   Surely, you must imagine, most 
of these have had an apparent impact on US GDP.    Sorry, you are mistaken.  Take a 
look at Figure 3, which illustrates US Real GDP with a logarithmic scale that turns 
constant rates of growth into straight lines.   Since 1970, US Real GDP has snaked 
upward along a straight constant-growth line, seemingly ignoring completely all the 
“shocks” that have buffeted the system.    Just in case you cannot see how straight the 
line has been, I have put a ±3% corridor around the 3% trend line.   That’s the 3-3 rule of 
US Real GDP.  The US GDP rarely strays more than 3% from the 3% per year trend line.   
 



















I am not a believer in immutable constants of complex human social systems and the 3-3 
rule of GDP growth does not have the scientific validity of 9.8 meters per second 
squared, but the facts are what they are.  I take this fact to mean that within their historic 
range of variability, fiscal and monetary policies have had negligible effects on long-run 
growth.   From this I conclude that fiscal and monetary policy should be focused on the 
task that remains: ironing out the cycle, and keeping real GDP well within its natural 































The Narrow Corridor of US Real GDP
3% Trend from 1970 to 2006
with +- 3% error bands  8
Temporal Orderings of Components of GDP 
First homes, then cars, and last business equipment. 
 
Though concerns about long-run growth are allayed by the 3-3 rule, there is still ample 
scope for policies to affect the amplitude and frequency of the ups and downs of the 
economy within the narrow corridor of economic growth.  To plan these policy 
interventions, we need to determine what causes the recessions and what can make them 
less frequent or less extreme.  Useful inputs into the formation of causal beliefs are the 
timing facts: which moves first and which moves later?  In this section, I will discuss the 
timing of the components of GDP first using an “episodic approach” that focuses only on 
the recessions and that allows each recession to have its own timing.  When that is done, 
we can summarize what we learn with a regression analysis that acts as if the timing were 
the same at every point in the business cycle: recession, recovery, expansion or spurt.  In 
case you cannot wait: first and foremost it’s homes that predicts recessions. 
Residential Investment Is a Small Part of Long-run Growth 
The BEA compiles a table called “Contributions to Real GDP growth” indicating the 
contribution of each component to the total GDP growth. Summary statistics of these 
contributions are reported in Table 1 for three separate periods: the high growth period 
from 1947 to 1969, the slower but unstable period from 1970 to 1984 and the stable 
period 1985 to 2006.    
 
Table 1   Contributions to US GDP Growth 
 
 
  Three Subperiods                   
  1947Q2 1969q4  1970q1 1984q4  1985q1 2006q4 
   Mean  Std. Dev. Qrtrs  Mean  Std. Dev. Qrtrs  Mean  Std. Dev. Qrtrs
GDP 4.03  4.92 91 3.16 4.81 60 3.10  2.02  88
Durables 0.47  1.90 91 0.42 1.32 60 0.49  0.92  88
Nondurables 0.85  1.16 91 0.57 0.79 60 0.59  0.45  88
Services 1.09  0.57 91 1.11 0.64 60 1.20  0.52  88
Defense 0.41  1.98 91 -0.01 0.66 60 0.05  0.50  88
Nondefense 0.12  0.84 91 0.08 0.42 60 0.05  0.21  88
State and Local  0.48  0.39 91 0.22 0.46 60 0.32  0.28  88
Equipment and Software  0.27  1.06 91 0.44 0.94 60 0.46 0.68  88
Inventories 0.14  3.41 91 0.13 3.03 60 0.01 1.56  88
Residential Investment  0.21  1.21 91 0.14 1.17 60 0.13 0.46  88
Structures 0.16  0.35 91 0.12 0.56 60 -0.01  0.38  88
Exports 0.13  1.28 91 0.36 1.01 60 0.62  0.75  88
Imports -0.29  0.85 91 -0.42 1.49 60 -0.81  0.91  88
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Figure 4 illustrates the “normal” contribution of each of these components, found by a 
kernel regression of the component on a time trend.
2  It is clear from the numbers in 
Table 1 and the displays in Figure 4  that the largest normal contribution comes from 
consumer services. Next in magnitude are the other consumer spending items: 
nondurables and durables.   Among the investment items, equipment and software has 
risen greatly in importance, especially during the Internet Rush.   Residential investment 
contributes a small fraction to total growth (recently, 4.2% of the total: 0.13 out of 3.10).  
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2 Alternative ways of filtering the signal from the noise in these data include exponential smoothing, 
moving averages, the Kalman Filter and the Hodrick-Prescott Filter.  These filtering techniques are 
designed primarily for short-term forecasting and they produce smoothed series that track the short term 
movements in the data too closely for our purpose, which is to uncover the long-term moving trend.   Thus 
after some significant trial and error, I hit upon the kernel regression smoother. 
3 The decline in GDP growth in the 1970s is evident in all three consumer components, and in state and 
local government, but not in the other components. That’s a puzzle worth exploring. 
4In terms of volatility as measured by the standard deviation, the inventories component is by far the 
largest. Much of the increased stability of GDP growth after 1984 is directly due to a reduction in the 
volatility of the inventory contribution to GDP How much of this reduction is due to improved inventory 
management and how much comes from greater stability of sales is not obvious.  After all, the volatility of 
every component of GDP declined after 1985, including most especially residential investment, durables 
and nondurables, all of which have substantial amounts of inventory in their supply chains and on retail 
shelves.   See, e.g.. McConnell et.a. (2000), or Cecchetti et. al.(2006) . 
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The Residential Investment Contribution to US Recessions Is 
Huge 
For long-run growth, residential investment is pretty inconsequential, but for the wiggles 
we call recessions and recoveries, residential investment is very very important.   To 
make this visually clear, I have created a series of figures that illustrate what was 
happening to each of the contributions to growth before and during the recessions.  These 
figures are created in three steps: 
 
1.  Find the abnormal contribution by subtracting out the normal contribution 




2.  Cumulate these abnormal 
contributions, thus turning the 
growth rates into levels.  See the 
residential investment example 
Figure 5 to the left which wiggles 
up and down around zero by 
construction.  When the curve is 
moving down, the contributions are 
less than normal; when the curve is 
moving up, the contributions 
exceed normal. 
 
3.  Extract the data around the 
recessions, normalized by 
subtracting the value at the cycle 
peak. This makes the value at each 
cycle peak equal to zero. 
 
This produces a set of figures like the one for residential investment, Figure 6.  The ten 
downward sloping curves in the top panel of this figure illustrate what was happening to 
residential investment in the year before the ten cycle peaks; the ten V-shaped curves in 
the bottom panel illustrate what was happening in the subsequent two years, a period long 
enough to encompass all the recession quarters.
 5  For your amusement, I have also 
included that last five quarters of data, ending with 2007Q1.  We have recently been 
skiing down a steep slope like the ten steep slopes preceding the ten recessions.  Note that 
the data for the ten cycle peaks are normalized to zero and displayed twice for each 
recession: once in the top panel and once in the bottom panel.   
 
Figure 7 is the corresponding graph for business spending on equipment and software.  
Figures for the other components can be found in an appendix.  
                                                 
5 The longest of these recessions (1974) was 5 quarters in length.   The 1980 post-recession period is 











Recessions Shaded  11
  
Figure 6    Weakness or Strength of Residential Investment Before and During Recessions 
Residential Investment
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Figure 7   Weakness or Strength of Equipment and Software Before and During Recessions 
Equipment and Software
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If you pause a moment to master these figures, I promise that you will be rewarded with 
special understanding of the US business cycle.  Most importantly, keep in mind that 
what is displayed is the cumulative abnormal contribution to GDP growth.   If the line is 
flat, that means the contribution, quarter after quarter, is normal.  If the line is declining, 
that means that the contribution, quarter after quarter, is less than normal, and this 
component is contributing to weakness in GDP growth.  If the line is rising, that means 
that the contribution, quarter after quarter, is greater than normal, and this component is 
contributing to strength of GDP growth.  So take a look at the figures and see if you can 
see falling, flat or rising.    
 
The residential investment curves in Figure 6 are all diving down in the top panel and 
making a quick U-turn in the bottom panel.    Thus residential investment is subtracting 
from GDP growth before the recessions but starts to contribute more than normal in the 
second or third quarter of the recessions.  See how different are the equipment and 
software graphs in Figure 7.  The diving down of equipment and software prior to the 
recession in the top panel is not so great and not so consistent as residential investment.  
And the U-turn at the bottom for equipment and software is deeper and much delayed 
compared with residential investment.    
 
In words, residential investment consistently and substantially contributes to weakness 
before the recessions, but business investment in equipment and software does not.  And 
the recovery for residences begins earlier and is complete earlier than the recovery for 
equipment and software.    
 
How big are these declines?  The decline of the residential investment abnormal 
cumulative by almost 1 full point in the year before the 1980 recession means that 
residential investment was removing almost 1% from the normal GDP growth of 3%.  In 
terms of weakness in housing, this was the most severe event, followed closely by the 
1973 downturn.   Eight of the ten recessions were preceded by sustained and substantial 
problems in housing, and there was a more minor problem in housing prior to the 2001 
recession.  The one clear exception was the 1953 recession, which commenced without 
problems from housing.   
 
In the bottom panel of Figure 6 we can see that problems in housing rather quickly turned 
around and housing started to contribute strength not weakness two or three quarters into 
the recessions.   In most cases, the weakness in the recession was more than offset by 
growth during the recovery within the two-years displayed (i.e. the final values displayed 
exceed zero at the end of eight quarters).
6   
 
Contrast Figure 6 for residential investment with Figure 7, which illustrates the 
cumulative abnormal contributions of business spending on equipment and software.  
Prior to the recessions, there was no apparent weakness in equipment and software in the 
                                                 
6 One exception was the 1974 recession.   This one had a very severe housing problem before the recession 
and the most severe during the recession.   The short-lived 1981 recession (two quarters) had a housing 
recovery that quickly collapsed.   The diagram displays only six quarters for this recession because the 
seventh was the first quarter of the 1981 recession.     14
first eight recessions.    But equipment and software spending was a major contributor to 
weakness during all the recessions except the short-lived 1981 event.   
 
And then, if you have the time, peruse all other components of GDP displayed in the 
figures in the Appendix, and make your own conclusions regarding what moves first and 
what comes later.  Keep in mind that the data for all ten recessions are displayed here, not 
just averages that might mask the peculiarity of some of the recessions.  My conclusions 
are coming after we build some tabular summaries of all these figures and some 
persuasive summary figures.   But already the message is forming: weakness in 
residential spending precedes recessions; weakness in equipment and software coincides 
with the recessions.  That temporal ordering ought to be considered when we weave our 
causal stories.    
A Summary Table 
The figures illustrating the cumulative contributions around the recessions are 
summarized numerically in Table 2.   The top panel reports data for the year before the 
ten recessions, and the bottom panel reports data during the recessions.  The data that 
form this table are answers to the questions: What was the maximum decline in the 
cumulative abnormal contribution before the ten recessions and what was the maximum 
decline during the recessions?   The last row of each panel in Table 2 reports the sum of 
these values, and the numbers above that row refer to the share of that weakness, 
component by component.   
 
Thus, for example, in the year prior to the 2001 recession, there was a total weakness that 
shaved 2.4 percentage points off GDP.  Of that total, 23% was due to weakness in 
consumer durables, 19% percent was due to weakness in spending on equipment and 
software, and 20% was due to weakness in exports.   
 
In this table, the largest contributor to each of the recessions is printed in bold with a box.  
The next to last column of this table reports the averages across the ten recessions, and 
the last column is an average of seven recessions, excluding 1953 and 2001 because of 
their unusual nature and 1949 because it both unusual and old. 
 
The 1953 downturn was caused by a huge shift in DOD spending commencing virtually 
the day the Korean armistice was signed on July 27, 1953, which coincides exactly with 
the official cycle peak.   Caught unawares, the economy experienced virtually no prior-
weakness, totaling only –0.9 compared with numbers –2 or more for all the other 
recessions.   The explanation of the 1953 recession is in the bottom panel, where we 
discover the huge total concurrent weakness of -8.5, 47% due to Department of Defense 
spending.    
 
The 2001 event is accurately called the Internet Comeuppance.   When profits on the 
Web disappointed investors, firms responded by cutting back investment in equipment 
and software, the component that played an unusually large role both before and during 
the 2001 downturn.   
   15
 
The last column of Table 2 reports the averages for the seven “normal” recessions, with 
the 1953 Defense Downturn, the 2001 Internet Comeuppance and the ancient 1948 
recession omitted.   The two panels in the table are sorted by these Avg-7 numbers, with 
the largest contributor at the top.   The figures in the appendix are sorted the same way.   
Do you see what’s on top?  
 
Table 2 
Contribution to Weakness in GDP, The Year Before the Recession           
Largest  in  Bold  and  Boxed               
               
 1949  1953  1957 1960 1970 1974 1980 1981 1990 2001  Avg Avg-7 
Residential Investment  30%  6%  22% 30% 20% 29% 32% 22% 21% 12%  22%  25% 
Durables  19% 18% 20% 12% 20% 24% 26% 10% 26% 23%  20% 20% 
Services  3% 0%  16% 2% 2% 9%  17%  28%  2% 8%  9% 11% 
Nondurables  7% 7% 0% 8%  11%  21%  10% 8% 8% 7%  10%  9% 
Exports  27% 31% 17%  0%  5%  0% 0%  14% 6%  20%  17%  6% 
Equipment and Software  15%  4%  0%  0% 7% 0%  15% 0%  25%  19%  14%  7% 
Fed  Defense  0% 0% 0%  22%  16%  12% 0% 0% 8% 2%  10%  8% 
Fed  Nondefense  0% 0%  16%  20% 6% 4% 0% 3% 0% 3%  7%  7% 
State and Local  0%  34%  1% 7%  10% 0% 0%  16% 3% 2%  8%  5% 
Structures  0% 0% 8% 0% 2% 2% 0% 0% 1% 3%  3%  2% 
TOTAL  -2.8 -0.9 -2.4 -2.3 -2.5 -3.1 -2.7 -2.7 -2.7 -2.4  -2.5 -2.64 
               
Inventories/TOTAL 23%  48%  4%  63%  24% 0%  28% 0% 8%  45%  24% 18% 
Imports/TOTAL  14% 50%  5%  2% 20% 0% 0%  14% 0% 0%  10%  6% 
 
 
Contribution to Weakness in GDP, Two Years Since Recession Began          
Largest  in  Bold  and  Boxed              
               
  1949 1953 1957 1960 1970 1974 1980 1981 1990 2001 AVG 
AVG-
7 
Equipment and Software  20%  7%  24%  19% 14% 17% 10% 21% 18% 35%  19% 18% 
Durables  5% 11% 18% 24%  20% 15% 14% 10% 18%  5%  14%  17% 
Nondurables  11% 11% 15% 16%  7% 16%  11% 5%  16% 7%  12% 12% 
Exports  7%  2% 15% 12% 12% 10%  6% 26%  4% 33%  13%  12% 
Residential  Investment  12% 4% 5% 7% 6%  19% 16% 12% 9% 2%  9% 10% 
Structures  12% 4% 5% 7% 6%  19% 16% 12% 9% 2%  9% 10% 
Services  11% 6% 4% 7% 6% 4% 13%  8% 15% 17%  9%  8% 
Fed Defense  11%  47%  14% 0%  28%  0% 1% 0% 5% 0%  11%  7% 
State  and  Local  0% 0% 0% 4% 1% 0%  13% 4% 4% 0%  3%  4% 
Fed  Nondefense  11% 8% 1% 4% 1% 0% 0% 3% 1% 0%  3%  2% 
TOTAL  -6.2 -8.5 -6.0 -4.5 -6.0 -8.6 -6.9 -6.6 -5.4 -5.8  -6.5  -6.3 
               
Inventories/TOTAL  56% 18% 22% 35% 16% 31% 23% 39% 12% 13%  27%  25% 
Imports/TOTAL  6% 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 0% 0%  2%  2% 
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Here’s the message: It is residential investment that contributes most to weakness before 
recessions.  In six of the ten recessions, residential investment was the greatest 
contributor to weakness prior to the recession.  Only twice of ten did residential 
investment not contribute significantly to weakness prior to the recession: the 1953 and 
2001 oddballs.  
 
After residential investment as a contributor to prior weakness come consumer durables, 
consumer services, and then consumer nondurables.  Those are all consumer spending 
items – it’s weakness in consumer spending that is a symptom of an oncoming 
recessions.     
 
Equipment and software ranks as the number one source of weakness during the 
recessions, compared with a rank of six prior to the recessions.  In terms of their impacts 
during recessions, after business spending on equipment and software come consumer 
spending on durable and nondurables.   
Average Cumulative Abnormal Contribution: Seven Consumer Cycles 
Numbers are difficult to internalize, so to get the message inside your head, averages of 
these contributions over the seven recent normal recessions are illustrated in  Figure 8 
(Consumer spending), Figure 9 (Business spending), Figure 10 (Government Spending), 
and Figure 11 (External Spending).  These are the climax we have all been waiting for. 
 
All four of the consumer items in Figure 8 contribute substantially to the path of a 
recession, both before and during. The timing is: homes, durables, nondurables and 
services.  Housing is the biggest problem in the year before recession, but is the first to 
start to improve in the second quarter of the recession.   Durables is the biggest problem 
during the recession, turning around at quarter 4.   Nondurables has relatively little 
weakness prior to the recession, but is number two during the recession, second only to 
durables.   Nondurables turns up in the fifth quarter after the cycle peak.  Consumer 
services has the most mild cycle, turning down in quarter -3 and back up in quarter +5.   
 
Business spending illustrated in Figure 9 has no weak components prior to the recession.   
With the onset of the recession, inventory contribution takes a big dip, but quickly 
recovers.  Equipment and software weakness is slower to develop but more long lasting, 
bottoming out in Q5.   The cycle in business structures is even milder and longer, not 
bottoming out until Q7. 
 
Government spending illustrated in Figure 10 played little role in these eight consumer 
downturns.  
 
The external sector illustrated in Figure 11 is an important part of the story of these 
recessions.   A significant part of the weakness in demand is shipped abroad via weaker 
imports, making the (abnormal) import contribution to GDP positive, not the normal 
negative.   But offsetting the positive contribution of imports is a substantial negative 
contribution of exports.  Why is that?  Is that the reflected wave of weaker US imports 
that caused weaker foreign GDP and weaker foreign demand for US exports,  or is that   17
only a symptom of the foreign role in a supply chain that begoms in the US where parts 
are made and ends in the US where the final product is sold?  
 
Finally, Table 3 reports the total cumulative weakness of all twelve components of GDP, 
defined as the peak to trough swing in the average cumulatives just displayed. The peak 
to trough swing in inventories subtracts 1.48 from GDP growth, comprising 19% of the 
total weakness. After inventories, come consumer durables and residential investment, 




Table 3   Contributions to Recessions Episodes 
Contributions to Recessions Episodes   
Cumulative Total Weakness Before and During    
Seven Normal Regression Averages     
      
1 Inventories  -1.48 19%
2 Consumer  Durables  -1.33 17%
3 Residential  Investment  -1.13 15%
4  Equipment and Software  -1.01 13%
5 Consumer  Nondurables  -0.85 11%
6 Exports  -0.81 11%
7 Consumer  Services  -0.67 9%
8 Business  Structures  -0.56 7%
9 Defense  -0.40 5%
10 Federal Nondefense  -0.23 3%
11 State and Local  -0.14 2%
12 Imports  1.01 -13%




Conclusion;  It’s a Consumer Cycle, not a Business Cycle.  Prevention of a consumer 
cycle requires special focus on the volatile components:  residences and durables.   Target 
sustainable building of homes and cars, and sustainable rates of appreciation of homes. 
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Figure 8    Average Consumer Contributions: Seven Consumer Recessions 
Consumer Contributions to Growth
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Figure 9    Average Business Contributions: Seven Consumer Downturns 
Business Contributions to Growth
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Figure 10    Average Government Contributions: Eight Consumer Downturns 
Government Contributions to Growth
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Figure 11    Average External Contributions: Eight Consumer Downturns 
External Contributions to Growth
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What about False Positives? 
The discussion to this point has focused on “false negatives” meaning recessions that 
were not predicted by weakness in one of the spending components.   There can also be 
false positives: recessions that were predicted that did not actually emerge.  To find these 
we need to look at all the data, not just the data around recessions.  
 
The cumulative abnormal residential investment data are displayed in Figure 12 with the 
recessions shaded.  This figure includes also the defense contribution.  With housing and 
defense included, we cover about 90% of the US cycle story in the last 60 years.  
 
To find the housing false negatives in this figure look for neutral or increasing residential 
investment values preceding these shaded regions.  One false negative occurred in the 
1953 recession.  This figure reveals why we had that recession – it was a sharp reduction 
in DOD spending.   The 2001 recession had some small contribution from housing, but it 
is probably best classified as a false negative.  These two false negatives we have already 
discovered in Figure 6.    
 
Now we want to find the false positives - sharply declining values in periods other than 
the years before recessions or during the recessions.  In the residential investment data 
displayed in Figure 12 there is one false positive in 1951-2 and another in 1966 -67.   In 
both cases housing was weakening substantially but there was no recession.  Why is that?  
Those two false positives occurred coincidentally with a big ramp-up in defense spending 
for the Korean War and the Vietnam War.   It is best not to think of these as false 
positives, but rather alarms of forthcoming recessions that were met by a response that 
prevented the recessions from occurring, however accidental the response might have 
been.   
 
The bottom line:  Housing provides an extremely accurate alarm of oncoming recessions.  
 
What seems like the next best predictor of recessions is consumer durables, illustrated in 
Figure 13.   Consumer durables has a lot in common with residential investment – the 
Korean War and the Vietnam war false positives and the 1953 and 2001 false negatives. 
 
The next best predictor may be consumer services, illustrated in Figure 14.  Here there 
are so many false negatives, it is hard even to consider it a viable contender.     21
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Multivariate Confirmation:  
It’s a Consumer Cycle, Not a Business Cycle 
The graphs that we have just examined allow an “episodic” analysis of the data that 
records ticks of the clock by the occurrence of recessions and that allows each recession 
to have its own characteristics.  Those desirable aspects of graphical inspections are 
offset by the two-dimension limitation of visual images.  For high-dimensional analysis 
we are forced to process the data numerically.  Table 4 reports a regression of GDP 
growth on all 1-quarter lagged contributions to GDP growth.  This multivariate 
regression uses calendar time to record clicks of the clock and thus treats all recessions as 
similar in temporal structure.   A dummy variable for years less than 1970 is included to 
account for the shift in mean of GDP growth at that time.   
 
The explanatory variables are sorted by their absolute t-statistics, which measure the 
independent contribution of the component of GDP, controlling for all the other 
variables.  So here it is again!  It’s a consumer cycle, not a business cycle.  The top four 
contributions with significant t-stats are residential investment, consumer services, 
consumer nondurables and consumer durables.  Business spending on equipment and 
software, structures and inventories do not contribute to the prediction of GDP growth in 
a measurable way.   
 
It is not just the t-statistics that should attract attention.  The coefficient on residential 
investment equal to 2 indicates that an unusual residential investment contribution to 
GDP growth in one quarter predicts twice as much contribution from some sector the 
next quarter.   Consumer services, with a coefficient of 1.7, also has a multiplicative 
effect.  All the other coefficients are less than one. 
 
Oddly, the coefficient on consumer durables is negative, not positive.  This should 
remind us that we are dealing here with partial correlations.  Controlling for the strength 
in the economy as measured by the other variables, an abnormal surge in durables sales in 
one quarter steals sales from the next quarter, making it weaker than it would be 
otherwise. 
 
The simple correlations are also recorded in the last four columns of this table, for 
coincident and lagged effects and for two subperiods: before and after 1970.  The largest 
coincident simple correlations are for equipment and software, and for inventories.   The 
lagged simple correlations for both of these variables are small.  This confirms what we 
have seen in the graphs: drops in business spending occur during the recessions, not 
before.  The largest lagged simple correlation for both subperiods is (you must know by 
now): residential investment, greater after 1970 than before. 
 
If you need more evidence, take a look in the appendix at the probit models for predicting 
rising unemployment one quarter ahead based on the components of GDP (residential 
investment wins) and the probit models in Leamer(2007) for identifying the year before 
recessions based on the ten components of the Index of Leading Indicators(housing starts 
and the slope of the yield curve offer accurate predictions).    24
 
Table 4 
Dependent Variable: GDP growth             
Method: Least Squares                 
Sample (adjusted): 1947:3 2007:1               
Included observations: 239 after adjustments             
       Simple  Correlations  
Contribution of:  CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic    Coincident  Lagged 1 Q 
       S1  S2  S1  S2 
I_RES(-1) 2.00 0.28 7.14 0.39 0.56 0.41  0.56
C_SERV(-1) 1.70 0.42 4.05 0.40 0.30 0.28  0.46
C_NONDUR(-1) 0.79 0.29 2.70 0.32 0.46 0.26  0.31
C_DUR(-1) -0.51 0.20 -2.49 0.47 0.57 0.13  0.28
GOV_FED_DEF(-1) 0.31 0.17 1.75  0.19 0.11 0.00  -0.01
GOV_FED_NONDEF(-1) -0.65 0.39 -1.66 0.00 0.02 -0.11  -0.09
GOV_STATE_LOCAL(-1) -0.67 0.59 -1.13  -0.05 0.21 -0.09  -0.03
I_STRUCT(-1) -0.56 0.57 -0.98  0.40 0.34 0.05  0.02
NX_X(-1) 0.22 0.24 0.90 0.07 0.37 -0.01  0.05
I_EQUIP(-1) 0.26 0.31 0.84  0.59 0.60 0.19  0.27
NX_M(-1) -0.15 0.25 -0.60  -0.27 -0.44 -0.19  -0.30
I_INVENT(-1) -0.02 0.09 -0.19  0.59 0.58 0.23  -0.11
C 0.57 0.56 1.03         
@YEAR<1970 1.00 0.50 2.02        
         S1  1947:2  1970:1 
R-squared   0.37      S2  1970:1  2007:1 
Adjusted R-squared    0.34           
S.E. of regression    3.30           
Durbin-Watson stat    2.15           
Mean dependent var    3.48           
S.D. dependent var    4.06           
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Hormones and Housing: It’s a volume cycle not a price 
cycle 
 
The reason housing is so important in recessions is that homes have a volume 
cycle, not a price cycle.     
 
Now that we know how important housing is to the US business cycle, the next step is to 
try to figure out why.  One very big clue is that housing has a volume cycle, not a price 
cycle.  Home prices are very sticky downward, and faced with a decline in demand, it is 
the volume of sales that adjusts not the prices.  With the decline in sales volume comes a 
like decline in jobs in construction, finance and real estate brokerages.    
 
Don’t forget that the P in GDP refers to production, and the appreciation of your home as 
you sip your chardonnay in your hammock in your back yard is not production and 
doesn’t count as part of GDP.  But jobs in construction, finance and real estate do count.  
Thus volumes matter for real GDP accounting, not prices.  Prices can matter indirectly 
through a wealth effect, but be a little skeptical about this.   Unless there is a change in 
the technology for transforming residential land into housing services the contribution of 
that land to GDP is about the same now as it was ten years ago or ten years hence.
7   
When we book the greatly appreciated land value as an asset for the homeowners, we 
should be booking the same appreciation as an exactly offsetting liability for future 
homebuyers.  
 
John Muelbauer’s paper in this same volume raises another important avenue through 
which home prices can affect spending – the easing of credit market access for 
homeowners. Whether this affect can be associated with a recession remains doubtful for 
me.  
 
But what is crystal clear is that the stickiness of home prices is a big problem for home 
volumes.  Normal sales volumes occur when buyers are confidant that home prices are 
likely to increase at normal rates, or at least not go down.  As I write these words, there 
are many localities that have very reluctant buyers thinking about getting better deals by 
waiting.  If prices could quickly reequilibrate when the housing cycle turns down, then 
normal appreciation and normal sales volumes would quickly reappear.  But the 
sluggishness of price adjustments is what makes the volume cycle so extreme, and what 
makes housing so important in recessions.  
 
Sales Prices and Volumes of Existing Homes in the LA Market 
 
The persistence of high prices of existing homes in the face of a market decline and a 
sharp drop in volumes are very evident in Los Angeles in the early 1990s.  Figure 15 
illustrates the median sales price and the volume of sales of existing homes in Los 
                                                 
7 Per the Hotelling rule, the (unimproved) value of  land should increase at the real rate of interest.    26
Angeles.  Here we can see the sharp run-up in both prices and volumes from 1985 to 
1989.  The sales volume peaked in November 1988 and fell by 50% in a year and a half.  
But price appreciation continued for almost a year until July 1989, and then, even with 
the sales rates at half the previous level, prices simply leveled off, until a year later in 
June 1991, when prices began an ever-so-slow decline, reaching their low point four and 
a half years later in December 1996, declining at roughly 5% per year, down a total of 
27%.  Had you purchased at the peak price in June of 1991 it would have bothered you 
that the same median sales price occurred almost a decade later in April 2001. 
 
It’s a volume cycle not a price cycle.   And it’s starting again.  The December 2006 
volume is off 29% from the peak in March 2004, and prices are leveling off, but not 
declining. (so far)  
 
 
Figure 15  Los Angeles Home Prices and Sales Volumes (Existing and New Homes) 
 
 
New Homes Nationwide Have a Volume Cycle, Not a 
Price Cycle, Too. 
Though builders are more motivated sellers than existing home owners, for new homes 
too, it’s a volume cycle, not a price cycle. 
 
Sales of new homes in four US regions from 1973 to April 2007 are illustrated in Figure 
16 with US recessions shaded.  Each of the four panels here includes a trend line and a 
































Volume down 29%   27
±20% band around that trend line, wide enough to capture most but not all of the 
variability.    
 
A hot housing market from 2000 to 2006 pushed sales rates of new homes toward and 
above that +20% line in all regions.  The last time the market was so strong was in the 
1970s when sales of new homes in all regions but the Northeast  floated well above that 
+20% band.   That 1970s housing market crashed in the double dip recession of the early 
1980s, when sales volumes in all four regions dipped well below the -20% line.    
 
A substantial dip in sales occurred in the other two recessions in this picture, the 1990/91 
and 1974/75 events.   The only recession of the ones illustrated in which sales did not dip 
below the normal band was the 2001 “business downturn.” 
 
A somewhat different image of the housing cycle comes from an examination of housing 
units started, Figure 17, which is a longer time series and includes both single-family and 
multi-family dwellings.  The trends in total units started are all less than the trend in 
single family homes, reflecting the shift in mix in favor of single family dwellings. For 
example, the Northeast has a substantial -1.2% per year negative trend for total starts 
compared with a -0.1% trend for single family homes.   All four regions have 
experienced a sharp reduction in housing starts, back to the 2000 levels in three regions, 
and much beyond in the very hard-hit Midwest where so many manufacturing jobs were 
lost in the 2001 recession, and never found again. 
 
Never mind, you are thinking.  It isn’t whether you can sell your home that matters.  
Sales volumes matter to your real estate broker and your title company, but not to you.  
That’s their jobs and their incomes at risk.  For you, it’s the price.  It’s the well-being that 
comes from knowing that your home is “worth” twice as much as you paid for it.  Might 
as well celebrate and buy another SUV.   Sorry, better think again.  The price of homes 
also varies, but in a way different from sales.  For one thing, the price trails the sales 
volume. Remember that:  “First comes volume, and then comes price.”   Something else 
to remember: the volume cycle is more extreme than the price cycle.  It you want to 
simplify and exaggerate, just say “It’s a volume cycle, not a price cycle.”  
 
Figure 18 illustrates the real prices of new homes sold in the same four regions, with 
trend lines and with ±10% bands.  We needed the wider ±20% bands to capture most of 
the ups and down in sales volumes.  Thus the cycle in volume is twice as amplified as the 
cycle in price. Figure 19 illustrates the corresponding nominal prices.  
 
The reluctance to sell into a weak market can keep nominal prices high, but real prices 
erode because of general inflation.  The wiggles and waves in the real prices illustrated in 
Figure 18 are caused by the ebb and flow of the race between home prices and the CPI.    
Real prices of homes decline when a housing time-out holds nominal prices fixed for 
several years, letting inflation of the CPI make the home less valuable in real terms.  
Using nominal prices, it really is a volume cycle, not a price cycle. 
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Take a look again at the real prices in Figure 18.  The South, where all that building is 
going on, has a lower real appreciation rate (1.1% per year) and the most stable prices, 
staying pretty steady inside the ±10% band.   The Northeast, where little building is 
occurring, has the highest real appreciation rate (2.0%) and rather volatile prices.  That 
gives a hint about housing markets.  It’s not the structure that has a volatile price; it’s the 
land.  Where there is plenty of buildable land, the response to an increase in demand for 
homes is mostly to build more, not to increase prices.  Where there is little buildable land, 
the response to an increase in demand for homes is mostly a price increase, sufficient to 
discourage buyers enough to reequilibrate the supply and demand. 
Fixed Price Stories 
If the notion that your home can fall in value troubles you, ignore the discussion of the 
real prices illustrated in Figure 18, and focus instead on Figure 19, which illustrates 
nominal home prices, unadjusted for inflation.  Here you can comfort yourself with the 
thought that home prices never go down; well almost never, and if they do, the decline is 
not very much.  There’s a reason for that.  We love our homes.  We don’t love our 
investments in General Motors or IBM, and when the stock market sends us the daily 
message that share prices have plummeted, we reluctantly accept that unwelcome reality.  
Homes are different.  We have a close personal relationship with our homes.  When the 
market is hot, buyers stream by our front doors proclaiming that they love our homes 
even more than we do by offering prices beyond our wildest dreams.   Charmed by that 
flattery, many of us sell our loved ones, confidant that we have turned our homes over to 
people who will treat them well.  Thus rising prices and high sales volumes.   When the 
market cools, however, only a few prospective buyers come to our front doors, and those 
prospective buyers bring a most unsettling message:  “We know you love your home, but 
it isn’t worth nearly as much as you think.”    That can be a deal-breaker for female 
owners, but the clincher for males is the fact that their idiot neighbor sold his home for $1 
million just last year, and the male owner is not going to take a penny less than that.  It 
doesn’t matter what the market thinks.  This house is worth $1million.  Period. 
 
Housing hormones, both estrogen and testosterone, make owners very unwilling to sell 
into a weak market and that unwillingness tends to keep the prices of homes actually sold 
high while greatly reducing the volumes of homes sold.  What we observe are not market 
prices but sellers’ prices.    
 
If you don’t like this love story, another good one is that sellers look backward, 
remembering what they or their neighbors paid, but buyers look forward, wondering what 
the house might be worth in a couple of years.  Positioned in time looking in different 
directions, when the market is rising, owners estimate the value less than prospective 
buyers, and a sale occurs, but when the market is falling, the owners remember the good 
old days of high prices, and the buyers are thinking about a better deal in a couple of 
months.  Then there is no transaction, unless it is at the high sellers prices.   A third story 
comes from the behavioral economics: It’s loss aversion.
8  As long as I don’t sell my 
home, I can comfortably maintain that it is worth what I paid for it.   
                                                 
8 For strong evidence of this in the Boston condo market see Genevose and Mayer (2001).   29
 
Of course, economists have no room in their models for love, hope, or the psychology of 
loss, and they may prefer an options story why sellers have high reservation prices during 
weak markets
9.  A seller would turn over not only the right to live in the house but also 
the option to sell in a year or two when the market might be stronger.  Timing preferences 
and transactions costs may make that option much more valuable to the current owner 
than to prospective buyers.  An owner may be ready or even eager to move in a couple of 
years, but buyers may generally be committed to longer horizons for their next move.  In 
addition, buyers would have to pay two transactions fees to exercise that option including 
both the brokers’ fees and the huge costs of an otherwise unwanted change in residence, 
while owners pay only the brokers’ fees (since they are planning on moving anyway) and 
only once.     With a high value of the option for the owner and a low value for the buyer, 
no transaction occurs.    
                                                 
9 e.g. Cauley and Pavlov(2002,2007), Pavlov and Wachter (2001) which consider the option to walk away 
from a non-recourse loan.    30
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The Phases of the Housing Financial Cycle: Hope, Hype, 
and Havoc 
A symptom of a housing market gone astray is greater appreciation for the 
cheaper properties. 
 
The damage done by rapidly elevating unemployment is very apparent, but it’s not just 
pink slips that are handed out during recessions.  It’s also notices of delinquencies and 
foreclosures.   Both the pink slips and the foreclosure notices are given disproportionately 
to the poor and the young, often to the very same families.   We don’t need to shed many 
tears for the get-rich-quick artists who back out of their options-to-buy investment 
properties when values go south, but a foreclosure is an undeserved slap in the financial 
face of the hardworking Americans who thought they could afford their homes because 
they qualified for the loans, only to realize later that the lender was expecting the home to 
pay for itself through continued appreciation.  Beyond limiting the damage 
unemployment does to working Americans, attenuation of the housing financial cycle is 
likely to reduce the financial damage done to the lifetime budgeting of many lower-
middleclass Americans.    
 
This time more than before it has been self-collateralizing loans and relaxed underwriting 
standards that have allowed borrowers with weaker credit histories and lower ratios of 
income to qualify to buy home at inflated prices late in a housing expansion.    In this 
section I report circumstantial evidence of these problems gathered from a study of prices 
of homes sold in Los Angeles from 1988 to 2006.  I use this data set to explore two 
possible consequences of the financial housing cycle.
 10      
 
1.  The financial cycle may be experienced disproportionately by low-income first-
time buyers. 
11 
2.  The idiosyncratic risk may be greatest for the homes bought at the peak of the 
mania, many by low-income first-time homebuyers. 
 
As is demonstrated below, the greatest appreciation in Los Angeles during the hot years 
of 2003-2005 occurred in low-priced zip codes and for smaller homes.  The correction is 
occurring as I write and it is too soon to say for sure, but the evidence to date suggests 
that the same homes that had the happiest of times in the hot years are having the saddest 
of times in the correction.   
 
What I thought I would find regarding idiosyncratic risk turned out not to be the case.  
The idiosyncratic risk is the part of the house appreciation that is not explained by market 
appreciation during the periods when the home is owned.  This idiosyncratic risk comes 
from buying and selling acumen (including the choice of location), and from changes in 
                                                 
10 By focusing on the cyclical aspects of housing finance and the impact on family balance sheets, I am 
hoping not to overlap much with Susan Wachter’s paper in this volume, “The Housing Finance 
Revolution,”  or with Robert Shiller’s, “Understanding Recent Trends in House Prices and Home 
Ownership.” 
11Vacation homes and investment homes purchased by the wealthy are also highly cyclical.   33
the property between purchase and sale.  It is surprising large with a standard deviation of 
roughly 30%.  And you complained about that 6% that accrues to the real estate brokers!  
Though very large, it is also very constant and doesn’t seem to move with the financial 
cycle.   
A story of the financial cycle 
Before looking at the data, first a story about the financial cycle.  Paul McCully(2007) 
has insightfully applied Hyman Minsky’s(1986) theory of the financial cycle to 
housing.
12   Minsky identifies three types of loans: hedge finance, speculative finance and 
Ponzi finance.   Hedge loans support the acquisition of assets with current profits 
sufficient to cover the interest charges and amortize the debt.  Speculative loans back 
assets with current profits enough to cover the interest charges, but these loans require 
growing profits to pay down the debt.   Ponzi loans back assets with current profits too 
low even to cover the interest charges.   
 
Substitute “income” for profits to get a story of the housing financial cycle.
13  In the first 
phase of the housing financial cycle, after a recession, heightened lender concerns about 
risk allow homebuyers to qualify for loans only if they have income levels high enough 
both to service the debt and amortize the loan – that’s hedge financing.
14  Later, after the 
period of heightened risk avoidance turns to normal risk concern, loans are given to 
buyers who can afford to pay the interest but who must rely on rising incomes or rising 
home values or falling interest rates to amortize the debt – that’s speculative financing.  
Next, after a period of prosperity and rising home prices, lenders forget all about risk, and 
loans are given to buyers whose incomes are not enough even to service the debt – Ponzi 
financing.  Ponzi borrowers who qualify on the basis of teaser rates or negative 
amortization rates face a reset/recast reality that can be dealt with only if their homes 
appreciate in value.   
Evidence of Diminished Underwriting Standards: Appreciation 
Greatest for Cheaper Homes  
Evidence of the financial cycle can be gathered from the sales records of homes in Los 
Angeles before and during the bubble years of 2003-2005, when greatly relaxed lending 
standards for both Subprime and Alt-A mortgages increased the number of Americans 
qualifying for mortgages.   
 
To explore the impact of these relaxed lending standards on home prices, I will make use 
of a data on purchase and sale combinations for homes sold in Los Angeles from 1988q1 
to 2006q4, collected by Dataquick.  One way to try to determine if the low-priced and 
high-priced homes are experiencing different rates of appreciation is to contrast the 
movement over time of the median sales price with the prices at the 10
th and 90
th 
percentiles.  Figure 20 illustrates the appreciation rates based on these percentiles.  Notice 
                                                 
12 See also Herring and Wachter (2002).   
13 If home-owning is treated as an investment, then the analogue of business profits is owner-equivalent 
rent.  
14 Do you remember the note-burning parties of an earlier generation of Americans?   34
that it is the 10
th percentile that had the highest appreciation in the period with relaxed 
underwriting standards, 2004-2005.   In the earlier high appreciation period in 1988-89, it 
was the 90
th percentile that experienced the greatest appreciation. 
 
 
Figure 20    Appreciation by Percentile from Transactions Data 


















The appreciation rates computed from transactions prices can mislead when the mix of 
homes sold changes over time, and when the median homes, 10
th percentile homes and 
90
th percentile homes are not roughly the same over time. A method to estimate market 
prices that doesn’t suffer from this problem of changing mix was pioneered by Case and 
Shiller(1987) and is now used by OFHEO and by Case-Shiller to compute home price 
indices for a large number of cities, for states and for the US overall.  Estimates of the 
quarterly rates of appreciation are found by regressing the logarithmic same-house price 
difference on dummy indicators turned on if the home was held in the quarter selected by 
the dummy. The coefficients in this regression are the estimated appreciation rate, quarter 
by quarter.  See Table 8 in the Appendix. 
 
To separate the appreciation rates of high priced homes from low-priced homes, this 
exercise has been conducted separately for the 20 zip codes with the lowest median price 
and the 20 with the highest.  This produces the appreciation rates displayed in Figure 21.   
Clearly, the appreciation was greatest for the cheaper zip codes in the hot market from 





   35
Figure 21    Estimated Appreciation Rates: Expensive and Cheap Zip Codes 
 
Estimated yoy Appreciation Using OFHEO method





































Another way to separate the high-priced from the low-priced homes is by size of the 
structure.  The data set includes the square footage of the home, and it is interesting that 
that average square foot of homes sold in LA fell a lot in the go-go years.  This may be 


































We can add to the Case/Shiller regression interactions between the log of structure size 
and the period dummies to allow the appreciation in each quarter to depend on structure 
size.  Then, using this estimated equation, we can compute the estimates of the 
appreciation at the 10
th percentile and 90
th percentile of structure size displayed in Figure 
23.  Consistent with the finding on zip codes, it was the smaller homes (condos?) that had 
the greatest appreciation in 2000- 2006, the opposite of 1988-1989. 
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Figure 23 
 














(Non-) Evidence of Diminished Underwriting Standards in 
Idiosyncratic Risk 
The next item on the agenda is the idiosyncratic risk.   A measure of this risk is the 
residual standard error (0.308) in the Case/Shiller regression.   That means that after 
controlling for the periods in which the home was owned and experiencing the overall 
market appreciation, the standard error of the realized appreciation was 30%, a very large 
amount of idiosyncratic risk.     
 
Figure 24 illustrates the standard errors of the residuals from the OFHEO regression 
reported in Table 8 by year of sale and year of purchase.  The briefer holding periods 
offer higher rates of return also come with larger standard errors.  But once the holding 
period gets to several years, the residual standard error hones in on that 30% figure.  I 
imagined that transactions with either a sale year or a purchase year in the hot interval 
from 2003 to 2005 would have greater idiosyncratic risk, but this risk actually seems 
rather stable.  Very large but not very cyclical.   37
 
 
Figure 24    Idiosyncratic Risk by Year of Purchase and Year of Sale 
Standard Errors of Residuals from Los Angeles OFHEO Regression
By Year of Sale and Year of Purchase
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The Conflicts between Housing and Inflation Targeting 
I take it as demonstrated that housing plays an extremely large role in the US business 
cycle, and I take it as clearly implied that the business cycle would be less frequent and 
less severe if the housing cycle were less frequent and less severe.  Though I understand 
that housing has not been a direct target of monetary policy, we can still ask if the 
historical policy choices have amplified or attenuated the housing cycle and we can ask 
what monetary policy might have been implemented if attenuation of the housing cycle 
were the only goal of the Fed.   
Homes and Consumer Durables Create Special Control 
Problems 
The traditional fixed-wage theory of unemployment and recessions needs to confront two 
important facts:  
 
1.  The early warning signs of a coming recessions are weakness in homes and 
consumer durables. 
2.  Most of the job loss in US recessions comes in construction and durable 
manufacturing.    
 
Why these two sectors?  Both durable manufacturing and residential construction have 
four special features:  
 
1)  Previous production of new homes and cars create a stock of existing assets that 
compete with current production.    
Long periods of unsustainably high levels of sales of new homes and cars that 
increase the existing stocks beyond equilibrium levels inevitably give rise to 
long periods of low levels of sales to bring the stock back to equilibrium.  
Conversely, the low levels of sales of homes and cars characteristic of most 
recessions create “pent-up” demand, which is met by high levels of production 
and sales in the recoveries after the recessions.   
2)  The service flow from the existing stocks of homes and cars is psychically very 
elastic and the ability to postpone the acquisition of new cars or new homes is 
very great.   
You can still get from point A to point B in that ten-year old car, and it 
wouldn’t be so bad to have your mother-in-law live with you, at least 
temporarily, would it?    
3)  The price of durability is the real rate of interest.   
If the real rate of interest is low, the equilibrium stock of homes and cars is 
high. When the real rate of interest falls permanently, production of homes 
and cars has to greatly exceed the normal levels in order to bring the existing 
stocks up to their new equilibrium levels.  But if consumers discover that the 
reduction in the real rate was only temporary, production and sales have to fall 
below normal levels to allow the stock to revert to it’s appropriate 
equilibrium.   39
4)  The asset prices of both homes and new cars suffer from downward price 
rigidities, for different reasons.   
Slow and predictable erosion of the asset prices causes low levels of 
production even if the (implicit or explicit) rental markets for existing homes 
and cars are crying out for more.   That, by the way, is where deflation is a big 
problem, not deflation of rental rates or deflation of prices for nondurable 
goods and services but rather deflation of asset prices of existing stocks of 
durables in the face of a strong rental markets.   
 
Here is the message from these four bullet points: Management of sales of homes and 
consumer durables by either businesses or monetary authorities is a difficult 
intertemporal control problem, with decisions made today affecting the range of options 
in the future.  If we choose to stimulate today, tomorrow our ability to stimulate will be 
less. 
 
With the mortgage market collapsing around us in 2007, this should be pretty clear.  
Normally, in a recession, sales of homes and durables are too low to maintain stocks at 
desired levels, and following a recession, low interest rates transfer sales forward in time, 
capturing sales that had not occurred during the preceding recession.  The 2001 recession 
was unique in that sales of both homes and durables held up well.  With no lost-sales to 
transfer forward in time, the low interest rates in 2002 – 2004 transferred sales backward 
in time, stealing sales that otherwise would have occurred in 2006-2009.    In 2007 the 
housing sector of the economy is now paying the Piper with very little possibility that a 
rate cut would make much of a difference.   Once the wave has peaked and is crashing, 
there is not much that can be done to quiet the waters. 
Inflation is Persistent, But for Housing, It’s the Cycle that’s 
Persistent 
A good way to contrast the control problems for inflation with the control problems for 
housing is to examine the correlograms for inflation and housing starts illustrated in 
Figure 25.  A correlogram for a time series, x(t), is the set of lagged correlations, x(t) 
with x(t-1), x(t) with x(t-2), x(t) with x(t-3) and so on.   
 
Figure 25 reveals that the correlation of CPI inflation with CPI inflation in the previous 
month is 0.63.   As the months become more separate the correlation slowly declines, but 
is still 0.2 after four years.   That’s a very persistent time series – once inflation gets 
going, it tends to hang on for a long time.  This is understood by our monetary authorities 
who are quick to stamp out the inflation fire before it gains a foothold. 
 
The correlogram for housing starts is very different.  The correlation of housing starts 
with housing starts in the previous month is the very high number, 0.93.  The correlation 
rapidly decays to zero after two years (24 months) but then it turns significantly negative, 
roughly –0.2 at 36 months.  That’s the correlogram of a cycle.   For housing, it’s the 
cycle that is persistent.  Once the wave of homes gets going, the system transmits that 
wave, up and down, far into the future.   
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Figure 25    Monthly Correlogram, Inflation and Housing Starts 














Residential Investment is not the only component of GDP with a long string of negatives 
in the correlogram.  Figure 26 illustrates the correlogram for the four contributions to 
GDP that have the largest average correlations.  These are the components that present 
intertemporal control problems.  It should not be a surprise that residential investment has 
the largest correlogram.  The other three with large correlograms are defense, business 
structures and business equipment and software.  Defense spending has a string of large 
negatives at eight to nine years referring to the defense cutbacks that inevitably follow 
defense buildups. (Or is that defense buildups that inevitably follow defense cutbacks?)   
It is unlikely that monetary policy could much affect the cycle in defense.  But what 
about the other three?  It seems promising that the correlograms of residential investment 
and equipment/software are similar in shape.  That leaves open the possibility that the 
control of the residential cycle might attenuate the cycle in equipment and software.  
More comments on this issue will be made in the conclusion. 
 
Figure 26    Quarterly Correlogram, Contributions to GDP 
Correlogram of Contributions to GDP, 1970Q1 to 2007Q1
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Policy conflicts among the targets:  Inflation Unemployment and 
Housing 
The three targets of inflation, unemployment and housing are not likely always to call for 
the same monetary policy.   Figure 27 is a scatter of housing starts and smoothed inflation 
based on the overall CPI including food and energy.  The axes are the historical average 
of housing starts and the hypothetical inflation target of 2 per cent. In this figure the 
northwest corner is the conflict area with weak housing calling for a rate reduction but 
high inflation calling for a rate increase.   
 
The year 1980 was about as bad as this conflict has ever been, but the slight negative 
correlation between housing and inflation when housing is weak means the US economy 
tends to create these policy conflicts with the highest inflation coinciding with the 
weakest housing market.  As of May 2007, the large circle, we are not deep into the 
conflict area but we may be getting there, as housing continues to deteriorate and 
inflation persists and possibly worsens.  
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Another potential target of monetary policy, unemployment, poses a different set of 
conflicts with housing, illustrated in Figure 28 with the horizontal axis at the average 
unemployment rate since 1959: 5.9.  Here the conflicts occur when high levels of 
unemployment coincide with high levels of housing starts or when low levels of 
unemployment coincide with low levels of housing starts.   The prominent role that 
housing plays in predicting recessions means that the conflicts between housing and 
unemployment are not great, except in 1967 when housing was very weak while the 
unemployment rate was very low.  But-for the Vietnam War, it seems likely that 
unemployment would have been greater and would have been rising at that time, thus 
eliminating the conflict.   In any case, a stimulus for housing wasn’t needed when DOD 
spending was so strong.   Thus the conflicts between an unemployment target and a 
housing target seem pretty minimal, except that the pursuit of low unemployment does 
not necessarily remind us of the housing intertemporal control problem: you can 
stimulate now or later, but not both.  The Keynesian framework in which unemployment 
is a centerpiece has no such intertemporal conundrum. 
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Estimated Regressions for the Fed Funds Rate and Housing 
Starts 
Some estimated regressions that explain the Fed Funds rate and housing starts are useful 
for further discussion of a housing target.  Of the many models that might be estimated, 
these are only examples, so don’t take them as literal truths. 
 
The regression explaining movements in the Federal Funds rate reported in Table 5 
creates a horse race between long-term interest rates, inflation, housing starts and 
unemployment, all trying to explain the movements in the Fed Funds rate since 1959, the 
starting point for the housing starts data. The negative coefficient on the lagged Fed 
Funds rate is the regression-toward-the-mean effect.  The positive coefficient on the 
lagged change in the rate is a momentum effect.  
 
In this regression, the coefficients other than the lagged Fed Funds rates are made 
comparable by standardizing each variable by dividing by its standard error.  Thus these 
coefficients answer the question: by how many basis points is the Fed Fund Rate changed 
when a variable increases by one standard deviation.   
  
This horse race is won by the bond market.  It’s the level and change in the rate on 10-
year Treasuries that best explains changes in the Fed Funds rate, measured either by the t-
statistics or the size of the coefficients.   
 
Unemployment nudges out inflation for second place in this race.    Last to the finish line 
is housing starts, with a low t-statistic and a small coefficient.  But we knew that, didn’t 
we.  The Fed hasn’t cared much about housing starts, has it?   44
 
Table 5   Equation for the Change in the Federal Funds Rate 
Dependent Variable: D(RATE_FF)         
Method: Least Squares         
Sample (adjusted): 1959M10 2007M05         
Included observations: 572 after adjustments         
        
Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
        
C -1.37  0.80  -1.70  0.089 
RATE_FF(-1) -0.10  0.02  -5.69  0.000 
D(RATE_FF(-1)) 0.28  0.04  7.02  0.000 
RATE_10Y(-1)/@STDEV(*) 0.27  0.06  4.29  0.000 
D(RATE_10Y(-1))/@STDEV(*) 0.13  0.02  5.80  0.000 
@MOVAV(INFLATION(-1),12)/@STDEV(*) 0.12  0.03  3.86  0.000 
@MOVAV(LOG(STARTS(-1)),3)/@STDEV(*) 0.04  0.02  1.97  0.050 
U(-1)/@STDEV(*) -0.11  0.03  -3.27  0.001 
D(U(-1))/@STDEV(*) -0.08  0.02  -3.74  0.000 
        
R-squared  0      Mean dependent var  0.003 
Adjusted R-squared  0      S.D. dependent var  0.572 
S.E. of regression  0.48      Akaike info criterion  1.389 
Sum squared resid  130.2      Schwarz criterion  1.458 
Log likelihood  -388.3      F-statistic  30.481 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.9      Prob(F-statistic)  0 
 
 
If the Fed did care about housing starts, the housing starts regression reported in Table 6 
might help to formulate some plans.   Here we see a long and complex dynamical model 
with housing starts two-three years ago affecting this month’s starts in a negative way.   
 
The financial variables that cool housing starts are a high real rate of interest, rising long-
term rates and an inverted yield curve.   I use this regression to justify a focus on the 
slope of the yield curve as a measure of monetary tightness.  In this focus on the slope of 
the yield curve, we have to worry again whether this is a predictive effect or a causal 
effect.  This depends on the power of the narratives.   
 
There is a very good predictive narrative. Few would buy a long-term Treasury paying 
less than a short-term Treasury unless economic weakness was expected when long-term 
rates will be lower, providing a capital gain to those who lock in the high rate now.  An 
inverted yield curve is the bond market’s way of forecasting economic weakness ahead. 
 
There is a very good causal narrative also.  The banking sector makes intermediation 
profits by taking deposits at short-term rates and making loans at long-term rates.  When 
the yield curve is steep, every loan has built into it a substantial intermediation profit 
cushion, which makes delinquency and default risk less important. But when the yield 
curve flattens, or, even worse, inverts, the intermediation cushion disappears and banking 
operations switch from pushing loans onto anyone who can crawl off the street to making   45
sure the borrowers are credit-worthy.  That’s a credit crunch, with many potential 
homebuyers denied mortgages on their homes of choice. 
 
This time, things were supposed to be different.
15  This time we would not get a credit 
crunch because we now allow Internet-based no-doc loan applications based on falsified 
income and borrowed credit scores, and because, through the magic of diversification via 
securitization, loan approval has been done by a what-me-worry bond market completely 
indifferent to delinquencies and foreclosures.   This time there would be no credit crunch.   
 
But this time was not different.  The Federal Reserve Board and very stubborn buyers of 
10-year Treasuries teamed up to give us an inverted yield curve, and the subprime 
meltdown followed soon thereafter, precipitating elevated loan standards across the 
board.  
 
Table 6   Equation for Housing Starts 
Dependent Variable: LOG(STARTS)         
Method: Least Squares         
Sample (adjusted): 1962:01 2007:05         
Included observations: 545 after adjustments         
        
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
        
C 0.784  0.179  4.4  0.00 
LOG(STARTS(-1)) 0.681  0.037  18.2  0.00 
@MOVAV(LOG(STARTS(-2)),6) 0.267  0.039  6.9  0.00 
@MOVAV(LOG(STARTS(-25)),12) -0.054  0.020  -2.8  0.01 
(RATE_10Y(-1)-RATE_FF(-1))/RATE_10Y(-1) 0.060  0.014  4.4  0.00 
RATE_10Y(-1)-RATE_10Y(-13) -0.018  0.003  -5.7  0.00 
RATE_10Y(-12)-@MOVAV(INFLATION(-13),12) -0.005  0.002  -3.0  0.00 
        
R-squared  0.89      Mean dependent var  7.33 
Adjusted R-squared  0.89      S.D. dependent var  0.21 
S.E. of regression  0.07      Akaike info criterion  -2.41 
Sum squared resid  2.80      Schwarz criterion  -2.35 
Log likelihood  663.0      F-statistic    710.2 





                                                 
15 Peek and Wilcox(2006) explain the part of the reduced volatility of US GDP growth to the growth in the 
secondary mortgage market.  Whoops.     46
A Report Card Based on the Housing Target 
Granted, housing has not been a Fed target, but we can still ask whether Fed behavior 
attenuates or amplifies the housing cycle.  If we were feeling cheeky, we could even 
grade the Fed performance.  In doing so, keep in mind that this is like having a Sociology 
professor grade an Economics exam.   So don’t be upset when the grades aren’t that 
good.  If we take inflation to be the target, the grades are much better. 
 
The left-hand column of Figure 29 illustrates the relationship between housing starts and 
the tightness of monetary policy, measured by the slope of the yield curve (rate_10y – 
rate_FF) divided by the 10-year Treasury rate. Each figure applies to a different housing 
cycle, from trough to trough.  The axes are the historical means of these variables, 1550 
for starts and 0.16 for the spread divided by the 10-year rate.   
 
Each figure includes a “sweet ellipse” in which housing and monetary policy are normal.  
The sweet ellipse has a downward orientation to reflect the fact that a tighter monetary 
policy should come with a hotter housing market.   Two arrows on this ellipse indicate 
the direction a hypothetical cycle might traverse.  Notice that at the average level of 
housing starts there are two different yield curves.  When housing is expanding, moving 
to the right, contractionary policy is in place to keep the expansion from going too far, 
but when housing is contracting, expansionary policy is in place to keep the contraction 
from going too far.  In other words, the housing control policy should depend on both the 
level and the direction of change in starts.  
 
The right-hand column of Figure 29 illustrates the course of inflation over the same 
periods, measured by the two-year rate of increase in the CPI.   This will keep reminding 
us that these grades are for an exam the Fed was not taking. The axis in the inflation 
graph is located at the presumed 2% target.  The appropriate anti-inflation targeting has 
the same orientation as the sweet ellipse: contractionary monetary policy when inflation 
is high but expansionary policy with inflation is low. 
 
1961 to 1966:  In the 1961 trough in the first figure, stimulative monetary policy has 
produced a steep yield curve.   This comes with improving housing starts, moving the 
economy into the “sweet ellipse” in which housing is normal and so is monetary policy.  
But tight monetary policy knocked the housing sector down and moved the economy 
substantially out of the sweet ellipse.  Housing grade:  A in the first semester, F in the 
second.   But that the reason for that contractionary monetary policy can be seen in the 
inflation graph, where inflation is creeping upward in the mid-60s.  Inflation grade: A in 
both semesters. 
 
1966 to 1970:  A shift from restrictive to accommodating gets housing back on its feet 
and moves the economy back into the sweet ellipse, but tight monetary policy soon 
enough kills off the housing sector and moves the economy back to a position again 
southwest of the sweet ellipse.  The direction of the cycle is the opposite of the one 
recommended.  At the 1500 level of starts, rates were more restrictive when housing was 
contracting than when housing was expanding. Again it was an ominous rise in inflation   47
that accounts for the contractionary policy.   Housing grade: A in the first semester, F in 
the second.  Inflation grade: A in both semesters. 
 
1970 to 1975:  Stimulative monetary policy got a housing recovery going and moved the 
economy back into the sweet ellipse, but further stimulation took housing to its all-time 
high.  That party was terminated by rapid tightening of monetary policy which got 
housing back to normal, but monetary policy reversed course too late, and housing could 
not recover from its unfortunate downward momentum.  That late-cycle stimulation came 
with a substantial increase in inflation from already high levels.  Housing grade:  B for 
effort, D for result.  Inflation grade: C.   
 
1975 to 1982: This loopy housing control is similar to the 1970 to 1975 loop, but not as 
extreme. Hardly any time was spent in the sweet ellipse.  The second cycle associated 
with the double-dip recession in the early 1980s has the same problem as all the others – 
its moving in the opposite direction of the arrows on the sweet ellipse. Housing grade:  B 
for effort, C for result.  Inflation grade: B. 
 
1982 to 1991:  Here with a pretty average yield curve we got a significant expansion of 
housing that moved the economy back into the sweet ellipse and held it there for a very 
long time. Monetary tightening produced an inverted yield curve in 1989, which was 
tough on housing, and subsequent monetary loosening in 1990 was too little, too late.   
Inflation, meanwhile, was controlled by a mostly flat yield curve.  Housing grade: B+.  
You almost got it right.  Inflation grade: A-.  You really got inflation under control. 
 
1991 to 2000:  Expansionary monetary policy starting in 1991 and then a return to a 
normal yield curve got the economy back into the sweet ellipse, where it stayed until the 
very end.  Housing grade: A-.  Great job; It would have been an A if monetary policy had 
been more neutral in 2000 when housing starts were weakening. Inflation grade: A.  We 
finally wrung that persistent inflation out of the system. 
 
2000 to 2007:  Highly stimulative monetary policy first moved the economy out of the 
sweet ellipse vertically and then housing got really hot and moved us farther from the 
sweet ellipse to the right.   Housing ignored the return to a normal yield curve, but 
couldn’t ignore the inversion in 2006, and we now find ourselves outside the sweet 
ellipse to the lower left, with a weak housing market and contractionary policy, when 
during most of the cycle we were outside the ellipse to the upper right, with highly 
stimulative monetary policy and a very strong housing market.  Housing grade: F.  I am 
really disappointed in your performance. Inflation grade: This depends on what risks 
deflation entailed.      48
 
Figure 29    Housing Starts, Inflation and the Slope of the Yield Curve 
 



























































































































































































































































































































































By the Way 
I feel like I am bursting with more to say, but neither space nor time allow it.  Briefly, 
here are a few more points. 
The Great Depression: Housing Again! 
 
The housing starts data available 
from the Census Bureau begin in 
1959 and leave us wondering what 
happened earlier, but in searching 
for references I ran across the image 
to the right of the earlier data in 
Ketchum(1954).   Look at that: 
housing starts declined beginning in 
1925!   Industrial production didn’t 
begin its nosedive until July 1929 
and the Dow Jones Average peaked 
in October 1929.  How weird is that!  
Problems in housing led the great 
depression by a full three years.  
Without doing the hard work to 
confirm, it seems possible that the 
increase in the discount rate in 1928 
was very hard on an already 
weakened housing sector, and set in 
motion the events that led to the 
Great Depression, dropping housing starts dramatically from over 900 thousand in 1925 
to under 100 thousand in 1933.  My point here, however, is that we should be looking for 
the roots of this episode in the operation of the banking system in 1922-1924 which 
allowed housing starts to peak so high  But, of course, I must defer to Bernanke’s(2000) 
Essays on the Great Depression, which does not emphasize housing.  
Durables and the Wealth Effect 
I haven’t had the energy or space to comment on the relationship between housing and 
consumer durables, both of which are very important in US recessions.  Is it enough to 
target housing, or do we need separately to watch consumer durables?   A relationship 
between durables and housing could come from three distinct sources:   
•  Housing and durables are complementary products (e.g. dishwashers, vacuum 
cleaners, furniture, etc.).  
•  Housing wealth helps to finance consumer durables spending. 
•  The same interest rates or other variables drive both the housing cycle and the 
durables cycle. 
It turns out that much of the amplitude in consumer durables comes from vehicles not 
furniture.   That seems to reduce the importance of complementarity.  Though the   51
housing wealth effect on vehicles is doubtlessly real, it operates with the kind of delay 
that is unlikely to connect housing wealth with durable spending rapidly enough and 
intensely enough to explain why spending on consumer durables declines within a quarter 
of the housing volume decline even though the price adjustment is much delayed.  So it’s 
the common driver: interest rates and employment.   
International Evidence 
In the course of writing this paper I have collected material on a large number of OECD 
countries.   Though the data sets are briefer, it is often the case that problems in 
residential investment precede spells of rising unemployment in many of these countries, 
but generally the evidence is not so compelling as it is for the US.  Of course, it isn’t 
surprising that many of these smaller countries “import” the business cycle via exchange 
rate turbulence and/or export weakness, while the US problems are mostly home-grown.   
For more on this, another time.    
 
I note that there is a large and growing literature on housing and the business cycle 
internationally, including the widely cited IMF piece, Helbing and Terrones(2003), and 
several OECD working papers, Van den Noord (2004, 2006) and Hoeller and Rae(2007), 
and the Fed study Ahearn et.al.(2005).  In contrast to the present paper, these studies 
focus on home prices, not home volumes.  In a paper on housing and the business cycle, 
there are several reasons for an emphasis of volumes.  First, without a volume cycle in 
some component of GDP, there cannot be negative growth of real GDP or rising 
unemployment and thus no recession.  Second, the wealth effects created by the price 
cycle are not likely to have much to do with the very short-run volume problems we call 
recessions.   For a recession, there needs to be some source of social coordination that 
gets large numbers of consumers or businesses to cut back spending at about the same 
time.   The negative wealth effect that we are now experiencing from housing is going to 
affect each of us in different ways at different points in time.  That’s a recipe for sluggish 
growth, not a recession.  
Conclusion 
The pertinent facts: It’s a consumer cycle, not a business cycle 
Housing makes an incidental contribution to normal economic growth.   
 
The average growth of GDP since 1947 has been 3.47 percent per year.  Only 
4.6% of that growth has originated in residential investment (0.16). 
  
Though unimportant in normal periods, weakness in housing is a critical part of US 
economic recessions.   
 
Excepting the Department of Defense Downturn in 1953 and the Internet 
Comeuppance in 2001, problems in residential investment have contributed 26% 
of the weakness in the economy in the year before the eight recessions since 
WWII, and 11% of the weakness in the two-year periods commencing with the 
recessions.    52
 
Most of the other leading weakness is also on the consumer side.   
 
In the years before recessions, 20% of the weakness is from consumer durables, 
10% from consumer services and 9% from consumer nondurables.  Thus 
consumers contribute a total of 65% of the leading weakness.   In contrast, 
business spending contributes only 10% of the weakness before recessions; 8% is 
from equipment and software and 2% from business structures.   Most of the 
weakness on the business side coincides with the recessions rather than leads 
them. 
 
The first item to soften and the first to turn back up is residential investment. 
 
The temporal ordering of the spending weakness is: residential investment, 
consumer durables, consumer nondurables and consumer services before the 
recession, and then, once the recession officially commences, business spending 
on the short-lived assets, equipment and software, and, last, business spending on 
the long-lived assets, offices and factories.   The ordering in the recovery is 
exactly the same.  
 
To summarize: It’s a consumer cycle, not a business cycle. 
Policy Targets 
Last, an apology, of sorts.  I am suggesting that housing starts should play a prominent 
role in the conduct of monetary policy but I realize that Section 2A of the Federal 
Reserve Act stipulates:  
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open 
Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit 
aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase 
production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, 
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. 
A shortened version of this task is: “Make us happy.”   Consistent with that task, here is 
my personal monetary policy to-do list: 
 
1.  Smooth the business cycle.  
 
Happiness and well-being are much affected by the collective unwanted idleness we 
call recessions.  It would be helpful if our monetary authorities could do something to 
make recessions less frequent and less severe and more short-lived. Housing surely 
deserves attention in that enterprise. 
 
2.  Keep us working productively 
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Happiness and well-being can also be affected if our financial markets absorb too 
much of our productive time and energy, and if savings are diverted into unwise real 
investments.  It would be helpful if our monetary authorities did what they could to 
limit the speculative bubbles that absorb our labor time and that divert savings into 
low-yielding investments. Housing surely deserves attention in that enterprise. 
 
3.  Limit the redistribution of wealth caused by financial market disruptions.
16   
 
The part of your wealth that comes deservedly from hard work and special foresight 
is not a problem for me, but I am made miserable when my wealth is transferred to 
you by unstable and uncaring financial markets.    It would be helpful if our monetary 
policy makers could minimize the extent to which turbulence in financial markets 
causes redistributions of wealth from one group to another, as for example, when 
unexpected inflation transfers wealth from lenders to borrowers.  Since housing price 
appreciation effects a substantial redistribution of wealth from renters (future owners) 
to current homeowners, housing surely deserves attention in that enterprise. 
 
4.  Keep our balance sheets accurately reflecting reality. 
 
Happiness and well-being can also be affected if we do not save enough to provide 
for the material and medical needs of our elderly.   The real assets on which our 
future depends are the factories and equipment and knowledge and homes that are 
needed to produce the GDP of the future.  The numerical valuations of these assets 
that we record on our hard drives are only a shadow of those real assets, a shadow 
that is sometimes larger and sometimes smaller than the real thing.  For us to do our 
planning correctly, we need these numbers to reflect reality.  We want our measured 
asset values to increase when our investments and discoveries make us confident that 
future GDP will be greater than we had originally thought.   We do not want a 
monetary system that allows us to put phantom assets onto our balance sheets and that 
signals to us that hard work and savings are not needed to prepare for our retirements.   
Housing surely deserves attention in that enterprise.   Of particular concern is the fact 
that, absent a change in the technology for transforming residential land into housing 
services, the contribution of our residential land to GDP is about the same now as it 
was five years ago, but on our hard drives we are recording real values for this land 
that are double what they were.





                                                 
16 Doepke  and Schneider (2006) , Bach and Stephenson(1974), Cuikerman, et. al. (1985)    
17 We have been here before.  Early in 2001 when newspapers reported “7 Trillion Dollars in Wealth 
Destroyed” I toured the nation to see the damage.   Not in Los Angeles, nor Houston, nor St. Louis nor 
Chicago nor Boston could I find a single factory, or office building or home in rubble, or a single city block 
under water.   Where was the wealth that was destroyed?   54
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Appendices 
Correction of the Defense Filter 
Figure 30, which depicts the kernel regression estimate of the contribution of defense, 
demonstrates that this method doesn’t work perfectly, since it assigns relatively high 
normal defense contributions in the 1947 to 1951 period because of the heavy defense 
spending in the Korean War commencing in 1951.  A corrected normal contribution of 
defense spending is illustrated in Figure 31 where I have taken the liberty of giving the 
kernel estimates from 1947 to 1958 a hair cut, thus allowing the defense contributions 
from 1947 to 1951 to be “normal” on average, not below normal per the kernel estimate 
in Figure 30.    
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Probit models for Predicting Rising Unemployment 
Though the variability in GDP growth is dominated by the recession negatives and the 
above-normal recoveries, the multivariate predictor of GDP growth reported in Table 4 
may be picking up something other than the recessions.  Just to make sure we identifying 
recession predictors, Table 7 reports probit models for predicting periods of sharply 
rising unemployment d(U)>0.4, each using a different component of GDP.  This 
separation of periods by the change in the unemployment rate accurately identifies the 
official NBER recessions, but without the arbitrariness of the decisions of a committee.  
 
The probit models reported in Table 7 include the lagged change in unemployment, and 
three variables representing changes in the indicated cumulative: the change over the 
previous quarter, the previous year and the year before that.   These results are sorted by 
the log likelihood function (or the McFadden R-sq).  The log likelihood is exponentiated 
to find the likelihood ratio expressed relative to the best model. 
 
The probit estimates reported in Table 7 reconfirm what we have already learned from 
the graphs:  the best predictor of recessions is weakness in housing.  The second best 
model uses nondurables but has a likelihood ratio that is only 18% of the residential 
investment model.  
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Table 7   Probit Probabilities of Sharply Rising Unemployment 
Dependent Variable: D(U)>.4             
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)           
Sample (adjusted): 1949Q3 2007Q1             
Included observations: 231 after adjustments           
Explanatory Variables;  Change in Unemployment and Changes in Cumulative Abnormal Contributions   
              
      Changes in Cumulative Contr.       
Coefficient    














Residences -1.84  2.19  -1.34 -0.41 -0.24  -44.92  1  0.461 
Nondurables -1.77 2.18  -1.02  -0.68  0.05  -46.61  0.18  0.441 
Services -1.78  2.22  -1.46  -0.71  0.11  -46.69  0.17  0.440 
Exports -1.83  2.75  -1.17  0.32  0.54  -46.80  0.15  0.438 
Structures -1.79  2.83 -1.07  1.33  0.71  -46.88 0.14 0.437 
State and Local  -1.73  2.66  2.44  -1.23  -1.06  -46.92  0.14  0.437 
Fed Nondef  -1.75  2.93  -1.25  -1.14  -0.20  -47.85  0.05  0.426 
Inventories -1.69  3.03  -0.13 0.22  -0.07  -48.43  0.03 0.419 
Equipment -1.69  2.89  -0.47  0.39 0.08  -49.06  0.02 0.411 
Imports -1.69  2.66  0.67  -0.23  0.11  -49.06  0.02  0.411 
Durables -1.69  2.50  -0.22  -0.12  -0.07  -49.43  0.01  0.407 
Fed Def  -1.67  2.66  -0.48  0.06  -0.02  -49.58  0.01  0.405 
              
z-Statistic              
Residences -8.9  4.7 -1.8  -1.2  -1.0      
Nondurables -9.1 4.4 -1.2  -1.3  0.2      
Services -9.0  4.8 -1.2  -1.1  0.2      
Exports -8.7  6.1 -1.5  1.0  1.9      
Structures -9.1  6.0  -0.6  1.9 1.2      
State and Local  -9.5  6.1 1.3  -1.4  -1.5      
Fed Nondef  -9.1  6.4  -1.0  -1.4  -0.3      
Inventories -9.5  5.8  -0.5  1.0  -0.4      
Equipment -9.6  5.0  -0.5  1.1  0.3      
Imports -9.6  5.7  1.0 -0.7  0.5       
Durables -9.5  5.4  -0.4 -0.4 -0.3       
Fed Def  -9.6  6.4  -0.5 0.2  -0.1       
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Case-Shiller Regression 
Table 8   OFHEO regression: Log Price Change Versus Ownership Period 
 
Dependent Variable: PDIFF     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/20/07   Time: 09:27     
Sample: 1 224341 IF HOLD_YRS>1   
Included observations: 201137   
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D1988Q2 0.066020 0.006051 10.91014 0.0000
D1988Q3 0.070990 0.005177 13.71372 0.0000
D1988Q4 0.048380 0.005213 9.280929 0.0000
D1989Q1 0.043787 0.005711 7.666645 0.0000
D1989Q2 0.059288 0.005763 10.28792 0.0000
D1989Q3 0.043172 0.005582 7.734041 0.0000
D1989Q4 0.038916 0.005805 6.703564 0.0000
D1990Q1 0.009046 0.006400 1.413444 0.1575
D1990Q2 0.007867 0.006491 1.211991 0.2255
D1990Q3 -0.018630 0.006276 -2.968307 0.0030
D1990Q4 -0.007740 0.006767 -1.143799 0.2527
D1991Q1 -0.024716 0.007505 -3.293486 0.0010
D1991Q2 -0.004386 0.006911 -0.634691 0.5256
D1991Q3 0.030517 0.006053 5.041431 0.0000
D1991Q4 -0.014710 0.006804 -2.162115 0.0306
D1992Q1 -0.033838 0.007586 -4.460525 0.0000
D1992Q2 -0.020328 0.007410 -2.743408 0.0061
D1992Q3 -0.004008 0.007015 -0.571368 0.5678
D1992Q4 -0.035429 0.007079 -5.004871 0.0000
D1993Q1 -0.029547 0.007458 -3.961906 0.0001
D1993Q2 -0.007814 0.007371 -1.060189 0.2891
D1993Q3 -0.029277 0.006881 -4.254687 0.0000
D1993Q4 -0.021902 0.006734 -3.252590 0.0011
D1994Q1 -0.032868 0.006701 -4.905263 0.0000
D1994Q2 -0.004142 0.006365 -0.650781 0.5152
D1994Q3 0.003950 0.006068 0.650956 0.5151
D1994Q4 -0.021197 0.006368 -3.328629 0.0009
D1995Q1 -0.016187 0.006803 -2.379271 0.0173
D1995Q2 0.007829 0.006690 1.170275 0.2419
D1995Q3 0.021245 0.006392 3.323830 0.0009
D1995Q4 0.004297 0.006790 0.632794 0.5269
D1996Q1 0.002763 0.007142 0.386820 0.6989
D1996Q2 -0.009904 0.006662 -1.486729 0.1371
D1996Q3 0.017758 0.006217 2.856324 0.0043
D1996Q4 -0.012454 0.006470 -1.924700 0.0543  62
D1997Q1 0.002793 0.006730 0.415050 0.6781
D1997Q2 0.023378 0.006418 3.642355 0.0003
D1997Q3 0.012183 0.005736 2.124172 0.0337
D1997Q4 0.016513 0.005657 2.919358 0.0035
D1998Q1 0.020697 0.005938 3.485320 0.0005
D1998Q2 0.023278 0.005639 4.127951 0.0000
D1998Q3 0.032363 0.005023 6.443042 0.0000
D1998Q4 0.005682 0.005236 1.085033 0.2779
D1999Q1 -0.018335 0.005545 -3.306436 0.0009
D1999Q2 0.048396 0.005241 9.233327 0.0000
D1999Q3 0.018293 0.004763 3.840826 0.0001
D1999Q4 0.006287 0.005000 1.257414 0.2086
D2000Q1 0.025394 0.005441 4.666890 0.0000
D2000Q2 0.045893 0.005237 8.763537 0.0000
D2000Q3 0.020462 0.004974 4.114015 0.0000
D2000Q4 0.011245 0.005242 2.145163 0.0319
D2001Q1 0.028081 0.005627 4.989984 0.0000
D2001Q2 0.042063 0.005440 7.731791 0.0000
D2001Q3 0.026675 0.004927 5.414237 0.0000
D2001Q4 0.008181 0.005206 1.571401 0.1161
D2002Q1 0.029143 0.005417 5.379572 0.0000
D2002Q2 0.057934 0.005041 11.49168 0.0000
D2002Q3 0.056197 0.004912 11.44039 0.0000
D2002Q4 0.030347 0.005188 5.849718 0.0000
D2003Q1 0.029062 0.005762 5.043565 0.0000
D2003Q2 0.056362 0.005814 9.694550 0.0000
D2003Q3 0.062411 0.005166 12.08130 0.0000
D2003Q4 0.044989 0.005173 8.696708 0.0000
D2004Q1 0.069541 0.005734 12.12759 0.0000
D2004Q2 0.095950 0.005759 16.65989 0.0000
D2004Q3 0.051858 0.005546 9.350439 0.0000
D2004Q4 0.019341 0.005825 3.320530 0.0009
D2005Q1 0.049117 0.006312 7.781425 0.0000
D2005Q2 0.074783 0.006215 12.03184 0.0000
D2005Q3 0.051610 0.005784 8.923036 0.0000
D2005Q4 0.040728 0.006082 6.696331 0.0000
D2006Q1 -8.01E-05 0.006834 -0.011714 0.9907
D2006Q2 0.018334 0.007922 2.314276 0.0207
R-squared  0.539296     Mean dependent var  0.320433
Adjusted R-squared  0.539131     S.D. dependent var  0.453066
S.E. of regression  0.307574     Akaike info criterion  0.480162
Sum squared resid  19021.04     Schwarz criterion  0.483869
Log likelihood  -48216.21     Durbin-Watson stat  1.986498
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Figures: Details of Contributions in All Ten Recessions 
Figure 32  Weakness or Strength of Consumer Durables Before and During Recessions 
Consumer Durables
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Figure 33    Weakness or Strength of Consumer Services  Before and During Recessions 
Consumer Services
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Figure 34  Weakness or Strength of Consumer Nondurables  Before and During Recessions 
Consumer NonDurables
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Figure 35    Weakness or Strength of Exports  Before and During Recessions 
Exports
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Figure 36     Weakness or Strength of Defense Spending Before and During Recessions 
Federal Defense Spending
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Figure 37  Weakness or Strength of Federal Non-defense  Before and During Recessions 
 
Federal NonDefense Spending
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Figure 38  Weakness or Strength of State and Local  Gov Before and During Recessions 
 
State and Local Spending
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Figure 39  Weakness or Strength of Business Structures  Before and During Recessions 
 
Business Structures
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Figure 40  Weakness or Strength of Inventories  Before and During Recessions 
Inventories
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Figure 41  Weakness or Strength of Imports  Before and During Recessions 
Imports
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